The aim of this paper is to focus on a specific part of the Better Regulation procedures: the Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme (REFIT). Within the Better Regulation process, the REFIT programme is, more specifically, focussed on evaluating existing legislation. The REFIT programme began in 2010 when the European Commission announced that it would be reviewing EU legislation in selected policy fields through 'fitness checks' in order to keep current regulation 'fit for purpose'. This included identifying 'excessive regulatory burdens, overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies and/or obsolete measures which may have appeared over time. Pilot exercises began in 2010 in four areas: employment and social policy, environment, transport and industrial policy.' In employment and social policy, the fitness check exercise was launched in the area of informing and consulting workers on the national level, with the evaluation of three Directives. The Commission then included Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) in the REFIT Programme. The third area evaluated was the Written Statement Directive. The paper analyses the REFIT as applied to the social field, through an evaluation of the REFIT Programme in the three areas where fitness checks have already been carried out. Our main conclusion is that the REFIT Programme has certainly legitimised the European Commission's lack of action and has fulfilled its social agenda. However, at the end of the evaluation programmes, the REFIT has not yet led to deregulation. On the contrary, some gaps have been identified which have led the Commission to begin a legislative review process.
Introduction
Since the turn of this century, Better Regulation has become one of the major issues on the European Commission's political agenda. Against the backdrop of implementing the conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of 2000, which requested that the Commission, the Council and the Member States define 'by 2001 a strategy for further coordinated action to simplify the regulatory environment, including the performance of public administration, at both national and Community level', 1 the Mandelkern Report on Better Regulation defined the first components of a better regulation policy. Since then, initiatives have proliferated, including the publication of communications, the adoption of action plans, and the conclusion of interinstitutional agreements. 2 The Juncker Commission has continued on this path and has made 'Better Regulation' a centrepiece of its policy. According to a communication from the European Commission, 'from the start of its mandate, the Juncker Commission made clear that we would break with the past and change the way the Commission works and sets its policies, by putting better regulation principles at the heart of its policy-making processes, to make sure its policies deliver better results for citizens, businesses and public authorities. ' 3 Although the claimed intention is to break from the past, there is a clear continuity between the approaches, and this position has, in turn, generated another raft of documents. 4 According to one of the most recently published documents, 'better regulation is not about regulating or deregulating. It is a way of working to ensure that political decisions are prepared in an open, transparent manner, informed by the best available evidence and backed by the comprehensive involvement of stakeholders. This is necessary to ensure that the Union's interventions respect the overarching principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, i.e. acting only where necessary at EU level and in a way that does not go beyond what is needed to resolve the problem. Better regulation also provides the means to mainstream sustainable development into the Union's policies.' 5 'Better Regulation covers the whole policy cycle -policy design and preparation, adoption, implementation (transposition, complementary non-regulatory actions), application (including enforcement), evaluation and revision. For each phase of the policy cycle, there are a number of Better Regulation principles, objectives, tools and procedures to make sure that the EU has the best regulation possible. These relate to planning, impact assessment, stakeholder consultation, implementation and evaluation' 6 Therefore, Better Regulation implies a set of specific procedures ranging from the preparation of initiatives to the evaluation of existing legislation. To summarise, 'from political declarations to interinstitutional agreements, from reports to action programmes, a genuine European strategy for better regulation is being built. It is based on a renewed perception of legislative quality: the classic demand for legibility (accessibility, editorial quality) has gradually been grafted with a set of criteria relating to the impact of legislation (added value, efficiency, effectiveness, efficiency, financial cost of the rules of law). The implementation of a technical economic rationality emerges from the methodological tools, techniques and procedures devised by the European institutions for ''better regulation''. Their implementation results in a stronger formalisation of the production of legislative texts, as well as a rationalisation of the existing legislation in an iterative cycle. These different developments have an impact on the decision-making process in the broad sense and on the institutional balances within the Union.' The aim of this paper is not to analyse the Better Regulation policy, its ambiguities and consequences in detail, 8 but to focus on a specific part of the Better Regulation procedures: the Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT). Within the Better Regulation process, the REFIT Programme is more specifically focussed on evaluating existing legislation. According to the website of the European Commission, 'REFIT is part of the Commission's better regulation agenda. It makes sure that EU laws deliver their intended benefits for citizens, businesses and society while removing red tape and lowering costs. It also aims to make EU laws simpler and easier to understand ( . . . ) REFIT pays particular attention to small businesses, which can be disproportionately affected by the burden of implementing EU rules.'
9 The REFIT Programme began in 2010 when the European Commission announced that it would be reviewing EU legislation in selected policy fields through 'fitness checks' in order to keep current regulation 'fit for purpose'. This included identifying 'excessive regulatory burdens, overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies and/or obsolete measures which may have appeared over time. Pilot exercises began in 2010 in four areas: employment and social policy, environment, transport and industrial policy. ' 10 In employment and social policy, the fitness check exercise was launched in the area of informing and consulting workers on the national level, with the evaluation of three Directives. The Commission then included Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) in the REFIT Programme.
11 The third area evaluated was the Written Statement Directive.
In these three areas of employment and social policy, fitness checks have been completed and, as required by the Better Regulation Guidelines, evaluations have assessed the 'effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU value' of existing regulations.
12 Formally, the completion of the fitness checks has taken the form of the publication of a Staff Working Document explaining the reasons for the REFIT, its methodology and main results. 13 The European Commission then presented future policy developments in the fields which had been evaluated.
The REFIT Programme has faced heavy criticism for its costs and underlying assumptions, as well as its likely consequences, as it could lead to a deregulation of social fields. According to Schömann, 'the increasing politicisation of the better regulation agenda, including REFIT, the latest initiative in this context, has led to the introduction of a rhetoric according to which any piece of legislation is deemed an obstacle to growth, competitiveness and employment, as well as particularly burdensome for SMEs. Quite apart from the criticism that can be levelled at its expensive, time-consuming, qualitatively questionable and still predominantly one-sided evaluation process, REFIT has become a real threat to the social acquis communautaire.'
14 The REFIT could also undermine the minimum harmonisation function of the European Social Directives. 15 Traditionally, the Social Directives merely defined a minimum set of rights upon which the Member States could improve. In each Social Directive, an Article provides that the 'Directive shall not affect the right of Member States to apply or to introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more favourable to workers or to promote or to allow the application of collective agreements more favourable to workers.'
16 Nevertheless, the REFIT discourse has sometimes threatened this articulation of competences between European and national law, and Member States have been accused of 'gold-plating' when they went beyond the minimum standards laid down in the EU-level legislation. 17 For example, the communication from the European Commission entitled 'Better regulation for better results', 18 urges 'Member States to avoid unjustified ''gold-plating'' of EU rules when transposing them into national law. While this may help achieving the legislation's objectives in the local context or aim to deliver greater benefits, it may also impose significant extra burdens. Member States should be invited to explain the reasons for any such gold-plating.' In other words, in contrast to standard statements from the European Commission, Better Regulation appears mainly to be about less EU legislation, 19 deregulating and deprioritising certain policy areas such as social protection.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the REFIT as applied to the social field, through an evaluation of the REFIT Programme in the three areas where fitness checks have already been carried out. Our main conclusion is that the REFIT Programme has certainly legitimised the European Commission's lack of action and has fulfilled its social agenda. However, at the end of the evaluation programmes, the REFIT has not yet resulted in deregulation. On the contrary, some gaps have been identified which have led the Commission to begin a legislative review process.
Informing and consulting workers

The three Directives under scrutiny
Employment and social policy was chosen as one of the areas submitted to the first REFIT Programme, and the Commission decided to review three EU Directives on informing and consulting workers on the national level: the Directive on collective redundancies, 20 the Directive on the transfer of undertakings 21 and the Directive on information and consultation. 22 It is not clear why the European Commission decided to start with these three Directives, although they are clearly complementary to one other. The Collective Dismissal and the Transfer of Undertakings Directives are among the oldest European Social Directives; they date back to the 1970s, were amended once and later consolidated. They provide for informing and consulting workers' representatives in the event of collective dismissal and the transfer of undertakings. Directive 2002/14/ EC is more recent. While the two previous Directives require the employer to inform and consult workers' representatives on specific events with important social consequences for workers, Directive 2002/14/EC establishes a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community. With this Directive, the EU established a procedure for ongoing and regular information and consultation with workers on recent and probable developments in the undertaking's activities, financial and economic situation, the evolution of employment and, in particular, on decisions that might lead to major changes in the organisation of labour.
While the link between the three Directives is real, the decision to select these three Directives alone is debatable. First, other Directives dealing with information and the consultation of workers' representatives exist and could have been included in the 'fitness check', notably the 24 and European cooperatives. 25 The Commission explains that the scope of the evaluation is reduced due to the national scope of the three Directives under evaluation. According to the Commission: 'While concerned with information and consultation of workers in a transnational context, the newly recast Directive 2009/38/EC on European Works Councils will be excluded from the fitness check exercise for several reasons: a) it is too recent (and the new amendments are not yet been transposed into national law by Member States); b) its adoption was preceded by a comprehensive and rigorous ex ante impact assessment; and c) it will be subject to a specific ex post evaluation later on as imposed by the Directive itself. Nor will the fitness check include Directives 2001/86/EC (European Company) and 2003/72/EC (European Cooperative Society). In fact, these Directives concern specific types of companies the review of which is linked to that of the related EU Regulations regarding the Statutes of such companies.'
26 The arguments are not entirely convincing, particularly because the connections between these Directives are various and numerous. Secondly, the Transfer of Undertakings and the Collective Dismissal Directives do not deal only with informing and consulting workers. Indeed, the Transfer of Undertakings Directive strives to comprehensively regulate situations when a transfer of a business takes place and its aim, according to its Preamble, is to 'provide for the protection of employees in the event of a change of employer, in particular to ensure that their rights are safeguarded'. The main objective of the Directive is to protect the employment rights of employees when ownership of an undertaking changes. To this end, the Directive establishes the principle that, upon the transfer of an undertaking, the employees of the transferor are to become employees of the transferee, under the same terms and conditions of employment and, consequently, the transfer of the undertaking should not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by either the transferor or the transferee. The contents of any existing collective agreement are also transferred. While the Collective Dismissal Directive is mainly concerned with informing and consulting workers' representatives, it also encourages governmental intervention to seek ways of alleviating the social consequences of collective redundancies. The common point of the two Directives is not only informing and consulting workers but also the fact that employees' rights are threatened by the situation of the company. In this regard, a link can be made with another Directive, the Insolvency Directive, adopted in the same period, which introduces certain obligations for Member States to take a limited economic responsibility for unpaid wages when a business can no longer pay its debts and wages. The three Directives are sometimes called the 'restructuring' Directives, as their main objective is to protect employees' rights in each of the three restructuring situations they define. Regarding the economic situation of the European Union in 2010, an evaluation of these three Directives would also have made sense. Once the three Directives had been identified, they were submitted for the fitness check by the Commission. The results were summarised in a staff working document, 'Fitness check on EU law in the area of information and consultation of workers', adopted on 26 July 2013. 28 The working document describes the methodology adopted and the main findings. According to this document, 'the fitness check relies on an evidence-based approach covering legal, economic and social themes related to the EU information and consultation legislation at issue. Stakeholders were closely associated through an ad hoc Working Group on information and consultation bringing together representatives of the EU/EEA governments and the European Social Partners, and by contributing to an independent external study'. Considering the methodology, therefore, fitness is mainly based on a number of studies and reports which have already been completed. 29 Additional evidence was also to be gathered over an extended period from a variety of sources including, 'appropriate consultation with the national governments and the Social Partners through the life-cycle of the exercise, a new study evaluating the operation and achievements of the information and consultation Directives and technical seminars and conferences with legal experts'. An inter-service group representing all relevant departments was set up within the Commission to supervise the exercise and the Commission launched a further study specifically to assess the opposition and effects of the three Directives.
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What are the main conclusions of these various sources? The main conclusion was summarised as follows: 'the evidence that has been gathered suggests that the EU Directives on I&C are broadly fit for purpose. They are generally relevant, effective, coherent and mutually reinforcing. The benefits they generate are likely to outweigh the costs. These findings have also been supported by the different stakeholders that were involved in the Fitness Check exercise and by the external study complementing it. Nevertheless, the evaluation has brought to light a number of issues relating to the scope and operation of the Directives. The SWD sets out a number of possible responses on the basis of good practice of meaningful social dialogue at different levels and by different actors, and points to the areas which need further examination and discussion which may lead to a consolidation of the three Directives following a consultation of the European social partners' 
Evaluation of the evaluation
Several comments can be made on the basis of the conclusions presented in the Staff Working Document. First, and contrary to what had been feared, the REFIT process did not justify a deregulatory initiative in this field. Rather, it confirmed the legitimacy of the European intervention, as the three Directives are very clearly described as ensuring the fundamental social right of workers to be informed and consulted in the workplace. Their benefits are acknowledged: 'the Directives seem to have contributed to cushioning the shock of the recession and restructurings during the crisis. I&C at company level has become important for solving problems, including maintaining employment and lowering adjustment costs through the use of internal flexibility. At the same time, it has contributed to easing conflicts and promoting a cooperative climate at workplace level. I&C is of crucial importance for developing good practices in anticipating change and preparing and managing restructuring properly. If good practices in anticipating change and restructuring were widely observed, this would contribute significantly to a better application of the I&C Directives and to more effective enforcement of the rights set out in these Directives'. The 'gold-plating' accusation, according to which Member States providing higher levels of protection are criticised, is not present. On the contrary, the fact that Member States can define more favourable rules is acknowledged and is not questioned as it has been in some recent ECJ decisions. 32 Here, the fitness check does not undermine the minimum harmonisation functions of the three Directives. Indeed, one of the conclusion is that the Directives 'prescribe minimum requirements and are flexible enough to be adapted to the specific contexts and industrial relations systems of the EU/EEA countries' and, as regards some of the identified gaps, the Staff Working Document stresses the fact that 'in any case, Member States may take action where necessary and adopt more protective measures, as appropriate, with due respect for national traditions and EU law, since the latter merely lays down minimum requirements.'
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Paradoxically, but not unsurprisingly, the fitness check also implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, reveals that evaluation is an impossible exercise. The verbs used ('suggest', 'seem', 'can') clearly highlight that the main conclusions are assumptions and hypotheses rather than scientific results. The fitness check also recognises that it is not possible to evaluate the costs of the Directives: 'on the other side, both employers and employees' representatives incur costs. For the former, the highest costs are those for supporting employees' representatives including time off work, for carrying out I&C and from delays to employers' decisions. It was not possible to quantitatively assess the above costs in a representative and reliable way on the basis of the available research. Such costs may considerably vary by country and by company depending on a wide range of factors. Employees' representatives bear mainly costs associated with handling I&C-related disputes and with training to enable them to perform their tasks. Overall, on the basis of the available evidence and stakeholders' assessments, it may be concluded that the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs incurred.' Ultimately, many of the conclusions derive from the opinions of the various stakeholders rather than from a scientific evaluation, if such an evaluation, incorporating legal, economic and sociological approaches, exists.
One of the last conclusions of the REFIT Programme, applied to the information and consultation Directives is, again fairly paradoxically, that the 'evaluation has brought to light a number of issues relating to the scope and operation of the Directives'. One of the main concerns is that a significant proportion of the workforce is not covered due to the exclusion of smaller SMEs, public administration and seafarers from the scope of application. The Staff Working Document sets out a number of possible responses on the basis of examples of good practice of meaningful social dialogue at different levels and by different actors, and points to areas which need further examination and discussion, which may lead to a consolidation of the three Directives following consultation with the European social partners. Thus, at the end of the process, a recast of the information and consultation Directives was contemplated.
In April 2015, following the REFIT, the European Commission launched the first phase consultation of the social partners under Article 154 of the TFEU on consolidation of the EU Directives on informing and consulting workers. 34 One of the main contributions of the recast would be the harmonisation of the various concepts used by the three Directives and, particularly, the definitions of the notions of 'information' and 'consultation'. Another issue, according to the Commission, relates to the extent to which the public sector is or is not covered. This consolidation could effectively improve the level of protection granted to workers by the European Union. However, the Commission's 2017 Work Programme no longer mentions it and recasting the Directives no longer appears to be on the cards. 
The impossible evaluation
The REFIT of the Occupational Safety and Health Directives has certainly been the most debated. 36 The Commission included the OSH evaluation in the REFIT Programme in 2012, perhaps because OSH had been identified among the most burdensome fields of EU legislation.
37
The REFIT aimed to cover all Directives dealing with health and safety issues, i.e. the 89/391/EEC Framework Directive aiming at securing a minimum level of protection from work-related health and safety risks for the workers of all Member States and the 23 Directives dealing with specific risks and situations. The scope of evaluation was therefore considerable, and the stakes were very high. Publication of the various reports was postponed several times and it was only at the beginning of 2017 that the exercise was completed.
The Commission's Staff Working Document was finally published in January 2017 at the same time as the Commission's communication on Safer and Healthier Work for All -Modernisation of the EU Occupational Safety and Health Legislation and Policy. 38 The evaluation is based on three main building blocks: a study by an external contractor, national reports on the practical implementation of the Directives established by the Member States, and extensive data collection as well as interviews with stakeholders carried out at both EU and Member State level. Given the volume of these documents 39 together with the technicality of the issues at stake, it is not easy to give an overall idea of the results of the evaluation. 40 One striking point is the recognition, throughout the documents, of the limits of the evaluation process itself: 'In overall terms, the evaluation suggests that EU OSH legal framework remains relevant. Ideally, in order to evaluate the full impact of the framework, an assessment would have had to be made at the time of the changes in national law and practice required by the adoption of the directives along with EUwide monitoring arrangements to check on progress, possibly with additional counter-factual analysis to ascertain what would have been the development across the Member States in its absence. This was not possible due to the lack of a robust ''comparison'' group, the lack of prospective data design for the evaluation at the time of the adoption of the Directives as well as the difficulties in differentiating between the impact of the EU legislation and the national legislation as well as other factors (non-OSH legislation, technological progress, structural changes in the labour markets, socio-economic developments, etc.)'. Another example regards the costs of compliance. According to the SWD, 'the evaluation shows that the administrative and substantive costs are likely to vary considerably from Member State to Member State and from enterprise to enterprise. This is related firstly to the fact that much of the EU legislation is goaloriented -the EU level legislation does not exactly specify how different measures should be put in place and the actual costs will depend on the specific situation of an enterprise and its interpretation of the obligations. Secondly, the costs of the EU legislation cannot easily be dissociated from more detailed national requirements. No firm conclusions could be drawn in the evaluation concerning administrative costs stemming from more detailed national requirements and/or EU legislation. Many factors might also influence compliance costs -especially the availability of support and accompanying measures from the EU, such as OiRA, and in Member States However, it should be noted that developing more accompanying measures also comes at a cost.'
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Despite these limits, the general conclusion is 'that the overall structure of the EU occupational safety and health acquis, consisting of a goal-oriented Framework Directive complemented by specific Directives, is generally effective and fit-for-purpose. However, it pointed to specific provisions of individual Directives that have become outdated or obsolete, and highlighted the need to find effective ways to address new risks. The way in which Member States have transposed the EU occupational safety and health Directives varies considerably across Member States'. However, overall, the evaluation clearly concluded that compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Directives is more challenging for SMEs than large establishments, while at the same time the major and fatal injury rates are higher for SMEs. Specific support measures are therefore necessary to reach SMEs and help them increase their compliance in an efficient and effective way.'
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Building on that conclusion, the Commission's communication proposed three main occupational health and safety actions: 'stepping up the fight against occupational cancer through legislative proposals accompanied by increased guidance and awareness-raising; helping businesses, in particular micro-enterprises and SMEs, comply with occupational safety and health rules; cooperating with Member States and social partners to remove or update outdated rules and to refocus efforts on ensuring better and broader protection, compliance and enforcement on the ground.'
Much ado about nothing
At the end of the REFIT process, the question may legitimately be asked whether it was merely a storm in a teacup. While health and safety issues were one of the most dynamic areas of intervention of European social policy, the initiatives announced were limited to updating some of the Directives. Admittedly, the importance of revising the six OSH Directives on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work should not be underestimated. However, there are no provisions for the problem of musculoskeletal disorders or psychosocial risks, for example. Compliance with occupational health and safety rules by microenterprises and SMEs is not really tackled in an integrated manner. In terms of the personal scope of the Directives, it is once again acknowledged that 'for most of the OSH Directives, some Member States implement more detailed or stringent requirements, with the result that the level of protection differs for some categories of workers like particularly vulnerable workers, selfemployed persons and domestic servants'. Yet, the conclusion is only that 'further analysis would be required to identify whether any changes to the scope or content of the directives could be opportune'. The role of labour inspections is also stressed -'the evaluation identified a large variation in the number and frequency of inspections in different member States' -but the conclusion is only that 'further examination needs to be given to the existing role and impact of Member State use of inspections and broader enforcement actions to target future actions'.
During the entire period of the REFIT, the Commission avoided making any legislative proposals in the area of health and safety, until the evaluation of the entire body of EU OSH legislation had been completed. 43 Several legislative proposals were blocked. The fate of the European agreement concluded by the European social partners in the hairdressing sector is a good example of this policy. The European Framework Agreement on the protection of occupational health and safety was signed in April 2012 and, as provided by Article 155 TFUE, the social partners asked the Commission to propose a Directive implementing their agreement on health and safety rules applicable to hairdressing salons. For the first time, the European Commission did not take the social partners' request into account and refused to submit an agreement to the Council, arguing that the European relevance and added value of the agreement first needed to be fully assessed. 44 The decision not to take any action was therefore explicitly linked to the REFIT Programme and presented as a positive decision not to add any further costs or burdensome legislation. 45 At that time, the decision was also taken not to take action on musculoskeletal disorders and screen displays. 46 Finally, a revised agreement was concluded in June 2016 and the signatories' social partners (UNI Europa and Coiffure EU) jointly requested the European Commission to submit the agreement to the Council to make it legally binding. However, the Commission continues to appear unwilling to implement the agreement; the agreement has been submitted for a proportionate impact assessment procedure and the Commission Work Programme 2017 makes no mention of it. 47 However, the paradigm of the social partners' collective autonomy should only imply weak control, as the agreement is the result of negotiations, i.e. an assessment by the social partners themselves of the need for a regulation.
The Written Statement Directive
Only one Directive evaluated
The REFIT process for the Written Statement Directive was much simpler, as it only addressed the evaluation of one Directive, and not the most complicated one, at that. Directive 91/533/EEC 48 was adopted in 1991, before the extension of the EU's social competences with the Social Protocol of the Treaty of Maastricht. Therefore, the Directive is based on Article 117 of the original Treaty of Rome, and the adoption required unanimity from the Member States. At that time, there was no specific treaty basis upon which the Commission could propose EU legislation on employment and labour matters. Under Article 117 of the Treaty of Rome, Member States 'agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained'. However, such harmonisation should flow from the functioning of the common market and although the Commission should promote close co-operation between Member States (Article 118), it has no competence to propose legislation in social matters. As a consequence, unanimity was needed within the Council of Ministers to base the proposal on a more general Treaty Article, Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome, which enabled the approximation of national provisions and which directly affects the establishment of functioning of the common market. This is one of the reasons why the Preamble of the Directive refers to existing differences among the Member States, which could 'have a direct effect on the operation of the common market'. As a consequence, the Directive is interpreted as having two goals, mainly a social goal (the obligation to inform the employees and improve their protection against possible infringements of their rights) but also an economic one (the obligation to create greater transparency in the labour market). This is not without consequence, as the evaluation must address to these two objectives. The Working Staff Document recognises, however, that the Directive's principle goal is social. 49 The Directive establishes, at European level, the general requirement that every employee must be provided with a written document containing information on the essential elements of his or her contract or employment relationship, no later than two months after the commencement of employment. The decision to conduct a REFIT evaluation was taken 2013 50 and two reasons were given for it. The first regards the Commission's evaluation policy. According to the Staff Working Document, 'regarding the aim of simplification, the High-Level Group on Administrative Burdens states that ''the Commission should consider extending the deadlines (contained in the Directive) in combination with giving companies the choice of means on how to inform their employee in the meantime. Furthermore, the Commission should examine the possibility to exempt micro entities from the written obligation following the principles of the Small Business Act without damaging the protection of employees'''. 51 The second reason was more social: the evaluation also concerns fundamental changes that have occurred both in the labour market and in EU law over the last 20 years with an increasing variety of employment relationships within the labour market.
The results of the REFIT evaluation are presented in a Staff Working Document which once again presents the methodology and the main findings. 52 Regarding the methodology, the evaluation 'relies firstly on a study carried out by an external consultant in close cooperation with the Commission'.
53 The report is 286 pages long and used a 'mixed methods approach to answer the evaluation questions, meaning that both quantitative and qualitative data have been collected and analysed from different sources, with data collection activities carried out across different groups of stakeholders. Data collection consisted of i) a review of existing literature on the subject, ii) an expert legal review in all countries covered, iii) qualitative interviews with key EU social partners and experts, iv) an online panel survey to employers in eight selected Member States with a total of 2052 respondents, and v) qualitative interviews with stakeholders in each of these eight Member States'. However, the Commission carefully specifies that this study is only a source of useful background information and does not represent the Commission's views: 'The Commission only endorses the findings and conclusions presented in the following sections, which might be different from those presented in the Study.' Secondly, the evaluation relies on an open public consultation launched by the Commission about the Directive: 'The consultation ran between 26 January and 20 April 2016, receiving 147 replies.' Finally, a new element appears: the evaluation was also informed by 'broader discussions and expertise acquired by the Commission, in particular on the European Pillar of Social rights'.
The conclusion is that the 'Directive is fit for purpose. Indeed, as shown under the ''Effectiveness'' section, the Directive fulfils its objectives (i.e. protection of workers and greater transparency on the labour market) to a significant extent. Moreover, the obstacles to effectiveness identified by the evaluation are an argument for strengthening the Directive rather than softening or repealing it. Costs deriving from the Directive are modest and no evidence was presented that cheaper ways of fulfilling the same objectives with the same effectiveness were available. Again, simplifying the Directive would lead more to strengthening it (by removing some or all the exceptions and options it currently provides) than softening or repealing it'. 54 Regarding the issue of effectiveness, the conclusion is that the Directive 'has been effective in reaching its objectives (i.e. protection of workers and greater transparency on the labour market) to a significant extent. Nevertheless, the evaluation has identified several factors hampering full effectiveness: In particular, the scope of application the Directive is somewhat problematic. It does not cover all workers in the EU as it allows some noteworthy exemptions and gives Member States the possibility to define whom they consider as ''a paid employee''. There is also a significant lack of clarity in practice whether some categories of workers (e.g. domestic workers) or some new forms of employment (e.g. on-call work or ICT-based mobile work) are covered or not. In addition, the enforcement of the Directive could be improved by rethinking the means of redress and sanctions in cases of non-compliance (the possibility for the employee to claim for damage compensation where the written statement was not received is not really used in practice). Furthermore, the two month deadline was highlighted by stakeholders as an aspect of the Directive that is not supporting the objective of increasing transparency and which may in fact increase the potential for undeclared work or abuse of employee rights.' Regarding the cost of the Directive, the conclusion is that 'the transposition of the Directive does not appear to have increased costs for companies to a significant extent'.
Towards the adoption of a revised Directive?
The ultimate conclusion of the REFIT is that a revision of the Directive could improve its efficiency and, on the same day as the Staff Working Document was published, the Commission published a Consultation Document launching the first phase consultation of Social Partners on a possible revision of the Written Statement Directive. 55 The European Commission's initiative is also explicitly presented as an implementation of the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, which explicitly address the challenges related to new forms of employment and adequate working conditions in atypical forms of employment, notably 'Secure and flexible employment' (Principle 5) and 'Information about employment conditions and protection in case of dismissals' (Principle 7). At the end of this first consultation, the workers' organisations agreed with the need to improve the effectiveness of the Written Statement Directive, expressing their willingness to enter into negotiations with employer organisations. In the event that negotiations were not launched or if they failed, the workers' organisations urged the Commission to come up with a legislative proposal to improve the situation of workers. The employers' organisations were opposed to setting a floor on the rights of EU workers, arguing that this could infringe the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. 56 They also expressed their willingness to engage in 'exploratory' talks with the ETUC. The European Commission has new launched the second phase consultation with the Social Partners under Article 154 of the TFUE, on the content of the envisaged Commission proposal concerning a revision of the Written Statement Directive. The Social Partners now have to decide whether they wish to enter into negotiations. At the beginning of the evaluation process, it was feared that one result of the REFIT evaluation would be a weakening of the protection granted to workers, as the two-month deadline by which the employee must be notified of the information had been challenged as had application of the Directive to small companies. As the Staff Working Document acknowledged, the evaluation actually led to the opposite conclusion: the delay could be shorter and there is no reason for excluding small companies from the scope of the Directive. The evaluation process also led to the conclusion that not only is the Directive useful, but its content could be improved, and it therefore legitimises a new European proposal.
There are, however, legitimate doubts as to the value of the REFIT process itself. Workers' rights to information on their working conditions (the identity of the parties and the place of work; the nature of the job; the date the contract begins and its duration; the amount of payment; normal working hours; the collective agreements governing the employee's conditions of work) is one of the most basic and fundamental of workers' rights. Is there really a need to evaluate the cost of this right which only represents for the company the cost of writing down this information and communicating it to the employees? The independent report dedicated 15 pages to this question, 58 before coming to the obvious conclusion that the cost was, indeed, not high, 'for the majority of employers the costs of providing the required written information to employees was assessed to be neither high or low. Rather, it was considered to be part of normal business activities'. The same remark could be made with regards to the conclusion that no simplification was necessary.
Another conclusion is also striking. According to the report: 'The analysis also revealed important differences in the implementation of the Directive across Member States where it leaves room for adjustment to national contexts. Most importantly there were found to be:
Varying delimitations of the material scope at national level, due to different national definitions of the terms ''employee'', ''employment contract'', and ''employment relationship''; Differences in the use of the derogations allowed by the Directive. In two thirds of the countries there is at least one derogation clause in use; Different requirements for timelines for providing information. 22 countries have introduced more stringent deadlines (than required by the Directive) for the employer to comply with their information obligation; and Varying effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms. There is strong evidence to suggest that remedy systems based only on claims for damages are less effective at ensuring protection of employee's rights and ensuring compliance with the Directive. On the contrary, the use of written statements as a protection mechanism appears to be most effective in conjunction with other protection mechanisms, e.g. in countries where there are strong labour unions 58. p. 83-98. The report concludes that the 'average administrative cost per employed person is EUR 34.1 (Figure 27 p. 95), while 'the average administrative burden per employed person for all company sizes is only around EUR 5.6' (Figure 28 , p. 96). The administrative cost consists both of costs perceived as 'business as usual cost' and 'administrative burden', where the administrative burden corresponds to the part of the administrative costs incurred solely because of the existence of the Directive. The refit scoreboard summary chooses to refer to the administrative cost, and concludes that: 'The emerging findings of the evaluation show that the notification of a written statement to employees is not a disproportionate burden compared to the benefits it brings, e.g. legal certainty for both sides and less litigations. The average one-off administrative cost per employed person for all company sizes is estimated at EUR 34.' (https:// ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cwp_2017_refit_scoreboard_summary_en.pdf) and/or labour inspectorates in place with a mandate to monitor employers' compliance with the obligation to inform'.
What is emphasised here is nothing more than the traditional structure of a Directive which leaves scope for difference among Member States.
Conclusion: is the REFIT fit for purpose?
The Better Regulation and the REFIT are, according to the Commission, 'a way of working to ensure that political decisions are prepared in an open, transparent manner, informed by the best available evidence and backed by the comprehensive involvement of stakeholders'.
Doubts may be raised as to whether the REFIT in action in employment and social policy complies with these characteristics and it may be claimed the REFIT has not proved to be an efficient method of evaluation, in contrast to the claims made by the European Commission.
First, the choice of the Directives which have been assessed is far from neutral and transparent. Evaluating a set of OSH Directives is an entirely different exercise than evaluating a single Directive such as the Written Statement Directive, particularly with regards to the consequences of the evaluation itself. Once the evaluation has started, this impedes any new legislative proposals for the entire length of the process. This does not seem to be as problematic when only one Directive is evaluated and when the procedure is short but, of course, this could be questioned when the entire area of health and safety is at stake.
Secondly, the methods used to evaluate the 'effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU value' of the Directives must be questioned. As the various reports highlight, the evaluation is largely based on the opinions, i.e. the subjective feelings, of stakeholders, without taking into consideration the basic conflict of interests inherent in labour relations and without any clear or transparent methodology on the capacity of these stakeholders to represent the various categories of labour relations. Indeed, the independent reports all use qualitative interviews with EU social partners and experts, and the European Commission has also launched public consultations on the Directives under evaluation. Both methods are definitely worthy of further debate. For example, the number of answers to the public consultations launched by the European Commission is very limited and is therefore of limited interest. 59 The independent reports also rely on opinion polls without, for example, taking into account the potential interpretation differences due to the conflict of interests existing in labour relations. 60 In fact, setting aside the evaluation of the Written Statement Directive, the two other evaluations conclude that, ultimately, it is not possible to evaluate the impacts of the various Directives. One of the reasons lies in the structure of the Directives themselves. Most of the time, the Directives lay down very general obligations and objectives and few substantive rules. They are also intended to be implemented in very specific systems of labour laws and industrial relations. To give but one example, the Directives on informing and consulting workers do not define the workers' representatives that have to be informed and consulted. National systems of workers' representation are very different, and it is not possible to isolate the effects of the Directives in the national legal, economic and social context in which they take place. Indeed, with the exception of the report on the Written Statement Regulation a critical assessment, supra note 36, p. 11.
